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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the emergence of new funds on the portfolio deci-
sions of mutual fund managers who are evaluated on the basis of relative performance
within a dynamic model. Recent theoretical literature has pointed to the ine¢ cien-
cies in portfolio selection caused by relative performance evaluation of fund managers.
We nd that the on-going process of the creation of new funds, by posing an entry
threat to the incumbent fund managers, greatly alleviates these ine¢ ciencies. Hence
the transitory market structure that characterises the mutual fund industry could
explain why relative performance evaluation is widely in use.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the impact of the emergence of new funds on the portfolio deci-
sions of mutual fund managers who are evaluated on the basis of relative performance
within a dynamic model.
Among practitioners there is no dispute on the fact that competition between fund
managers is based on relative, rather than absolute performance. From the early 90s a
revived research interest on the relationship between past performance, fund ow and
managerscompensation has developed. Sirri and Tufano [21] study the ow of funds
into and out of equity mutual funds and nd that clients invest disproportionately
more in funds that performed very well in the previous period. Similarly Chevalier
and Ellison [6], looking at a sample of growth and income funds, nd signicant non-
linearities in the shape of the relationship between fund ow and past performance.
Thus mutual fund managers with asset-based compensation schemes would like to
maximise the ranking of the fund in order to achieve maximal investment inow1.
The fact that fund managers are motivated by relative performance incentives
raises e¢ ciency concerns. Agency theory provides a rationale for relative perfor-
mance evaluation (Holmström [9] and Mookherjee [17]). However the nature of the
mutual fund industry is such that delegated portfolio management di¤ers from a stan-
dard principal-agent relationship at least in two ways: it is typically dynamic, and
it involves not only e¤ort exertion but also decisions about the risks to be taken.
Meyer and Vickers [16] show that, in a dynamic setting, comparative performance
evaluation has an ambiguous impact, and that it is not guaranteed that it enhances
e¢ ciency. Moreover, Hvide [10] points out that relative performance evaluation might
be undesirable when agents not only choose the level of e¤ort (expected return) but
also the riskiness of their actions (variance).
Several empirical studies have tested the hypothesis that risk-taking decisions by
fund managers are a¤ected by relative performance incentives. Brown et al [2] and
Chevalier and Ellison [6] nd that riskiness proles of fundsportfolios are altered
during the course of the calendar year as if fund managers were involved in a tourna-
ment where each fund aims at market leadership. Managers with very good mid-year
1Similar behaviour can result from the need to retain existing clients (Heinkel and Stoughton
[11]).
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performances tend to lock in their gains in more conservative positions; worse per-
forming funds take higher risks in order to gamble their way up the yearly rankings.
This evidence has recently been challenged by Busse [3] and Goriaev et al [8]. By
using daily rather than monthly data on US equity funds, they nd little evidence in
support of the tournament hypothesis for mutual fund managers and claim that pre-
vious results are spurious due to neglected auto-correlation [3] and cross-correlation
[8] of fund returns.
This recent debate on the tournament hypothesis does not challenge the fact that
relative performance incentives are in place, but rather it focuses on the impact that
they may have on fund managers risk-taking decisions. From a theoretical point
of view, this poses the question of why fund managers would not respond to their
incentives when choosing the riskiness prole of their portfolios.
In this paper we take the view that the impact of relative performance incentives
on fund managers risk-taking behaviour will be attenuated by the process of the
emergence of new funds. We show that relative performance evaluation need not
result in ine¢ cient risk-taking behaviour when the market in which the fund managers
operate is contestable. A poorly performing fund faces a higher probability of losing its
leadership versus a potential entrant. In the presence of contestability, fund managers
who compete on the basis of rank still aim at a high absolute performance in order
to deter entry.
There is ample evidence that the mutual fund industry is characterised by an
on-going process of emergence of new funds, often launched by the same mutual fund
groups as part of a larger family of funds. In any given year during the 80s and early
90s, 6% of all fund assets were held by new funds that had been in existence less than
1 year and 25% in funds that had existed less than 2 (Khorana and Servaes [14]).
Assets in the US-based mutual funds increased 24% in 1999: investment performance
accounted only for two-thirds of the growth; the remainder was attributable to net
new cash ow and the emergence of new funds (Mutual Fund Fact Book 2000 [13]).
We model a two-period game played by two incumbent fund managers who at the
beginning of each time period choose the riskiness prole of their portfolios. We rst
analyse the game with no entry and nd that fund managers who compete for rank
condition their portfolio choices in the second stage on their relative performance in
the rst stage: past winners act conservatively and past losers gamble.
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We then ask how the presence of entry a¤ects fund managersbehaviour. We
assume that there is a third fund that might decide to enter the market in the second
stage of play. Our main result is that entry alleviates the ine¢ ciencies in risk-taking
behaviour caused by relative performance incentives. The presence of an entrant has
a positive impact both in the second stage of play, when it results in increased com-
petition, and in the rst stage of play, where the entry threat induces the incumbent
fund managers to take more e¢ cient portfolio choices in order to deter entry.
We model competition across fund managers as a tournament where competitors
only win if they obtain the highest rank: with more competing managers the probabil-
ity of obtaining the highest rank by investing in the safer asset class decreases; hence
funds prefer to invest in the risky portfolio in order to outperform a larger number of
competitors. The impact of increased competition on risk-taking is greater when the
probability of success of the risky portfolio is not too small: hence fund managers will
choose the risky portfolio when this is more likely to be the optimal choice from the
point of view of the investors. We assume that there is a small positive cost to entry;
hence the third fund will only enter the competition if there is a strictly positive prob-
ability that he may win the tournament. Very high levels of interim performance will
make it impossible for the entrant to catch up; given that the two incumbent funds
prefer the entrant not to enter (expected payo¤s are lower with a larger number of
competitors), they will tilt their portfolio decisions to the riskier asset class, hoping
to obtain higher interim performances that would deter entry. The implicit cost of
entry deterrence consists of the fact that, in order to avoid increased competition
in the second stage, each of the incumbents may have to choose a portfolio other
than that which he would have chosen in order to outperform his current competitor
in the interim stage. When the probability of success of the risky portfolio is very
small, entry deterrence through higher risk taking is both unlikely to be e¤ective and
very costly; hence entry deterrence will only tilt portfolio decisions of fund managers
towards the risky asset class when this is the e¢ cient investment.
This paper contributes to the literature on mutual fund tournaments. Most of
this literature is empirical and aims at assessing the validity of the tournament hy-
pothesis2. Alongside the empirical contributions, there is a growing theoretical lit-
2Brown et al [2], Sirri and Tufano [21], Chevalier and Ellison [6], Busse [3], Goriaev et al [8].
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erature that considers the risk-taking implications of rank-based competition in a
game-theoretic setting. Most of this literature assumes a given market structure:
Taylor [22], Goriaev et al [7] and Sciubba [20] provide mutual fund tournament mod-
els that can be compared to our benchmark case with no entry3. The interplay of
relative performance incentives and competition in the mutual fund industry has been
studied by Kristiansen [15] and Palomino [19]. Both papers nd that increased com-
petition induces higher risk-taking for fund managers. In [15] higher risk-taking may
reduce e¢ ciency: fund managers become more prone to risky noise trading than to
making informed portfolio choices. Palomino [19] endogenises the level of competition
and shows that relative performance incentives result in a positive selection of fund
managers: compared to the case where managers are compensated on the basis of
their absolute performance, relative performance incentives imply that low quality
managers are more likely to stay out of the market. This clearly increases the average
quality of competing funds.
As in [19], we consider entry decisions to be endogenous. However the main
question we pose is di¤erent. Palomino [19] studies the impact of relative performance
objectives on the degree of competition, the size of the industry and the selection of
good versus bad fund managers. We instead focus on the impact of potential entry
and increased competition on risk-taking decisions by fund managers, in the presence
of relative performance objectives.
Moreover, in contrast to both Kristiansen [15] and Palomino [19], we have a dy-
namic model where entry only occurs at an intermediate stage. This allows us to
disentangle the two separate reasons whereby entry induces higher risk-taking: in-
creased competition in the second stage, and entry deterrence in the rst stage.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we present the model; in section 3
we derive our results for the second stage of play, both in the benchmark case with
no entry and in the presence of a potential entrant; section 4 contains our results for
the rst stage of play and our characterisation of the two-stage equilibria with and
without entry. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides policy implications. For
ease of exposition all proofs are in the appendix.
3In the context of an R&D tournament, Cabral [4] derives similar results to our benchmark model.
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2 The Model
Consider a two-period model of a nancial market with two incumbent fund managers
and a potential entrant. All funds are endowed with one unit of capital. The two
incumbents make portfolio decisions at the beginning of each time period (at t = 0 and
t = 1); the third fund may enter in the second period, after observing the performance
obtained by the two incumbents in the rst period.
In each period portfolio decisions are made simultaneously. Returns obtained by
the incumbents in the rst period are entirely reinvested, so that nal returns are
cumulative. The entrant starts with one unit of capital in t = 1 and invests for one
period only. There is an arbitrarily small positive cost to entry, so that the third fund
prefers not to enter unless entry results in strictly positive expected prots.
Portfolio Choice: Fund managers can form their portfolios from two alternative
asset classes, with di¤erent expected return and risk characteristics, such as tradi-
tional sectors and new technologies. To keep our analysis as simple as possible we
assume that it is too costly for fund managers to invest in both asset classes at the
same time, so that in each time period they specialise in one or the other sector4.
In particular, we call portfolio S the investment in the traditional sector, and
portfolio R the investment in new technologies. Both portfolios yield binary returns:
in case of success portfolio S yields a rate of return s; and portfolio R yields a rate
of return r, with r > s > 0; in case of failure both portfolios yield 05.
We assume that there are no direct links between the two sectors, so that the
success of the traditional portfolio is not correlated to the success of the portfolio
in new technologies. When the two fund managers invest in di¤erent asset classes,
portfolio S succeeds with (known) probability p, and portfolio R with (known) prob-
ability q, with p > q > 0. On the contrary we assume that when fund managers
choose to invest in the same asset class, the likelihood of their success displays some
positive correlation: the joint probability of success is determined by the risk that is
idiosyncratic to each fund as well as by some degree of sectorial risk. In particular,
when n funds are investing in the traditional sector, the joint probability of success
4Taylor [22] and Sciubba [20] show that, when fund managers have rank based objectives, fund
managers choose extreme portfolios even when they are allowed to diversify.
5The assumption of positive rates of return is not crucial: allowing for negative and bounded
rates of return would not a¤ect our results from a qualitative point of view.
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is equal to pnn 1, where   1 and n = 1; 2; 3. Similarly, when n funds are investing
in new technologies, the joint probability of success is equal to qnn 1, with   1
and n = 1; 2; 3. Clearly the case  =  = 1 corresponds to independence and the case
 = 1=p and  = 1=q corresponds to perfect (positive) correlation6.
Further, to make the problem interesting, we pose two parametric restrictions.
For our results it is important that sectorial risk is not too substantial, so that we
rule out very high correlation7. In particular we assume:
Assumption 1   1
p
h
1  q
p
i
and   p
q
This assumption is not too restrictive if we consider the two asset classes to be
broad enough so that the two fund managers can specialise within each class. More-
over, in order not to obtain trivial results, we rule out the case where the di¤erence
in returns from the two portfolios is extremely large. In more detail we assume that
the cumulative return of successfully investing for two periods in the safer asset is
higher than the return obtainable from the risky portfolio in one period only:
Assumption 2 (1 + s)2 > (1 + r)
Incentives and Compensation: Fund managers in our model only care about their
compensation. We assume that managers are not compensated period by period, but
rather at a nal assessment stage on the basis of their cumulative performance. Per-
formance is measured in relative terms, and leadersare more than proportionately
compensated with respect to followers, so that the incentive scheme is convex.
For the purpose of this analysis, we consider the simplest incentive scheme that
displays these characteristics, i.e. a bonus contract based on nal rank. In a richer
model, this type of incentive scheme would result from the interaction between com-
pensation contracts typical to the fund management industry (fees proportional to
assets under management)8 and investorsbehaviour in picking up funds (i.e. ocking
6The full joint probability matrices are in the appendix.
7From an empirical point of view, this is consistent with some recent evidence: Ahmed [1] shows
that correlation among equity funds is not too high. Hence a multi-fund portfolio is far less risky than
its single-fund counterpart, which also explains why investors often prefer to pursue a multi-fund
strategy.
8Evidence shows that most contracts do not contain a performance-based fee component. Golec
[12] reports that only 6 percent (29 of 476) in his sample of mutual fund managerial contracts contain
explicit performance incentives. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, Kristiansen [15] shows
that, provided the number of competitors is not too large, even in the presence of explicit contractual
incentives based on the absolute performance achieved by the fund manager, the implicit incentives
based on the rank achieved in a tournament with other fund managers are more important.
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to previous winners). Here, for simplicity, we provide fund managers with explicit
relative performance incentives.
In more detail, managers are ranked according to their performance at the end of
each period; the rank achieved at the end of period 1 (interim stage) is observable
but has no impact on the managers compensation; the rank achieved at the end
of period 2 (bonus stage) fully determines the managers compensation. The fund
manager that achieves rst rank obtains a strictly positive bonus, which we normalise
to 1; the manager who achieves second (or third) rank obtains a smaller bonus,
which we normalise to 0. Convexity of the compensation scheme requires that when
fund managers achieve the same (top) performance, their compensation is su¢ ciently
smaller than if they were rst rank; for simplicity we assume that in the case of a tie,
fund managers are compensated as if they achieved second rank.
Optimal Investment: Here we do not explicitly model the investorsobjective
function. A very risk-averse investor may prefer that the fund manager invests in the
safer asset class; on the contrary, a mildly risk-averse investor may prefer that the
fund manager invests in the riskier assets, as long as its expected return is su¢ ciently
high. In general, investorspreferences will depend on how the expected values of
the two portfolios compare to their riskiness. When the riskier asset pays out only a
marginally higher return with a very small probability, rational investors will typically
nd the safer asset more desirable. On the contrary, if the riskier asset pays out a
signicantly higher return, with a probability that is not too small compared to the
safer asset, only extremely risk-averse investors would prefer the fund managers to
invest in the safer asset, and most rational investors would nd the riskier asset more
desirable.
In absence of a specic objective function for the investors, we are not able in
general to draw welfare conclusions. However, under assumptions 1 and 2 there cer-
tainly exist parameters such that the safe portfolio is more desirable for any rational
investor (consider s ! r and q ! 0 as an extreme example). Moreover, despite our
parametric assumptions give some advantage to the safer asset class, they nevertheless
allow for the case where the risky portfolio has a much higher expected return than
the safe, so that all except very risk-averse investors would nd the risky portfolio
more desirable.
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3 Bonus Stage
3.1 The Benchmark Case: No Entry
Suppose that there is no entrant in the second stage. We can solve the game between
fund managers backwards: call the two stages of play interim stage and bonus stage
respectively, and focus on the bonus stage rst.
In order to analyse the bonus stage, we need to x a history for the interim
stage which consists of the actions played and of the realisations for the risky and
safe portfolios. A convenient feature of this setting is that the bonus subgame will
only depend on the interim relative performances and not on the interim absolute
performances and the actual actions played. The following denition provides us
with a useful notion of interim relative performance between the two incumbent fund
managers.
Denition 1 If, at the end of the rst stage, players 1 and 2 display performances
(1 + x) and (1 + y) respectively, we call jx  yj the performance gap between the two
incumbents.
One can easily verify the following:
Remark 1 The subgame in the bonus stage only depends on the performance gap
between the two incumbents.
At the end of the interim stage each fund has an endowment equal to either 1,
or (1 + s) or (1 + r). According to the realisation of the performance gap we can
distinguish four di¤erent scenarios after the interim stage: performance gap equal to
0, s, (r   s) and r. We dene a useful notion of sizefor the performance gap:
Denition 2 We call the performance gap large if it is larger than (r s); and small
otherwise.
Notice that, given the discrete nature of returns that we consider here, the per-
formance gap is small only if it is equal either to 0 or to (r  s); it is large9 only if it
is equal either to s or to r.
9Notice that assumption 2 implies that (r   s) < s.
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The lemma below provides a full characterisation of the equilibrium in the second
stage of the game.
Lemma 1 (Bonus subgame - No entry) Under assumptions 1 and 2, when the
performance gap is small the unique NE of the bonus subgame is (S; S); when the
performance gap is large (S;R) is the unique NE of the subgame.
The intuition for these results lies in the behaviour of the interim follower that
faces a given performance gap. When the performance gap is small, the follower
may potentially catch up with the leader by using either investment strategy. In
this scenario both players will invest in the portfolio which succeeds with the higher
probability. When the performance gap is large, playing risky becomes a dominant
strategy for the follower, given that only the superior return provided by the risky
portfolio, when successful, would allow him to close the large interim performance
gap. Given that the follower plays risky, the interim leader will best respond by
investing in the portfolio that pays out with the higher probability, hence maximising
his chances of not losing ground. Finally, when the performance gap is extremely large
so that the follower has no chance of outperforming the leader, he will be indi¤erent
between the two portfolios: we assume10 that he will invest in the risky portfolio.
These results are in line with the empirical ndings by Brown et al [2] and Cheva-
lier and Ellison [6]. In the pre-assessment period (here the bonus stage), funds have
an incentive to alter their riskiness proles. In particular, funds that are ahead of
the market lock in their gains in conservative positions, while worse-performing funds
attempt to gamble their way up the rankings.
3.2 Entry
Suppose that there is a third fund that might decide to enter at the end of the rst
stage and compete for market leadership alongside the two incumbents in the second
stage. The entrant observes the interim performance of the two incumbent funds
10The reason why the follower is indi¤erent between safe and risky portfolios is that the latter is
not riskyenough and does not allow him to catch up with the leader. In such a circumstance it
seemed reasonable to assume that the follower, when indi¤erent, would still go for the risky portfolio.
This would certainly happen in a richer model with a larger choice set of risky options.
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at the end of the rst stage, and decides whether to enter. There is a (small) cost
to entry, hence the new fund will only come into the picture if he faces a strictly
positive probability of obtaining market leadership. Market leadership is achieved on
the basis of cumulative performance. Hence the two incumbents have an advantage in
that they accumulate returns over two periods, while the entrant only has one period
of investment to catch up. In this set-up, high interim performances may discourage
entry.
Alternative ways of comparing performances across the incumbents and the en-
trant fund are: comparing only the second period performance, or comparing the
average two-period performance of each of the two incumbents to the one period per-
formance of the entrant. Both alternatives imply that returns obtained in the second
stage by the entrant are overweighted, so that entry can never be deterred through
a high level of interim performance. We believe that our modelling choice, although
stylised, is closer to what may happen in practice when investors choose among funds
with a di¤erent length of track records. Funds with shorter track records appear to
have a disadvantage with respect to longer-established funds.
In the bonus stage of the game with entry, not only the performance gap but also
the actual strategies played by the managers in the interim stage matter. This is
because the absolute performance of both funds (and not only their relative perfor-
mance) is important in determining what is the chance that an outperforming entrant
might appear. Hence we need to distinguish more cases than in the benchmark, and
in particular we need to distinguish within the 0-performance gap subgames those
where the two incumbent funds have an interim performance of 1 (0 gap at 0); in-
terim performance of 1 + s (0 gap at s); interim performance of 1 + r (0 gap at
r).
Below we follow the convention that the rst player is the interim leader, the
second player is the interim follower and the third player is the entrant. If the
entrant does not enter, no investment choice is given for the third player.
One can easily prove the following:
Remark 2 The entrant decides not to enter if either of the two incuments has interim
performance equal to (1 + r).
An immediate consequence of the remark above is that in the game with entry,
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the subgames with 0 gap at a performance of r, with (r  s) gap, and with r gap, are
the same as in our benchmark case with no entry. Hence in order to complete our
analysis, we will only need to obtain equilibria for those subgames where the entrant
does enter.
Lemma 2 (Bonus stage - zero gap at 0) Consider the bonus subgame after 0-
performance gap at 0. Under assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) i¤ q < p(1  p)2 then (S; S; S) is the unique NE of the bonus subgame;
(b) else (S; S;R), (S;R; S) and (R;S; S) are NE of the bonus subgame.
As for the case with no entry, the 0-performance gap subgame is symmetric and
all players (including the entrant) face the same chances of obtaining the leadership.
With respect to the benchmark case, we observe more risk-taking. In more detail:
while in the in the benchmark case both players invest in the safe asset class; with
entry, for q su¢ ciently large, one of the players chooses the risky portfolio in equi-
librium. It is not surprising to nd that fund managers aiming at maximising their
rank choose riskier portfolios when they are faced with a larger number of competi-
tors. Increased competition results in more risk-taking when q is su¢ ciently large, i.e.
when the risky portfolio pays out with a higher probability. In our set-up, this may
alleviate ine¢ ciencies induced by relative performance incentives when these result
in suboptimally low levels of risk-taking.
Lemma 3 (Bonus stage - zero gap at s) Consider the bonus subgame after 0-
performance gap at s. Under assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) i¤ q < p(1  p)(1  q) then (S; S;R) is the unique NE of the bonus subgame;
(b) else (R;S;R) and (S;R;R) are NE of the bonus subgame.
The 0-performance gap subgame at performance of (1 + s) is a symmetric game
for the incumbents, but not for the entrant, who enters in the second stage with a
disadvantage. He can only catch up with the incumbents by investing in the risky
portfolio. Hence risky is a dominant strategy for the entrant. For q su¢ ciently large
at least one of the two incumbents will also respond with risky. With respect to the
benchmark case with no entry - where neither of the players plays risky - this has
clearly more chance of being e¢ cient, given that it applies, in particular, to the case
where the expected return of the risky portfolio is much higher than the safe.
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It is interesting to assess the impact of absolute interim performance on risk-taking
decisions. We can compare the parametric conditions such that increased competition
results in more risk-taking in the following two cases: 0 gap at a performance of 1,
and 0 gap at a performance of (1 + s): We nd that worse-performing funds are
more prone to risk-taking. Increased competition clearly poses a higher threat to
low-performing funds than to high-performing ones: hence worse-performing funds
tilt their portfolios towards risky alternatives for a larger set of parameter values.
We now compare the conditions under which more risk-taking is observed in the
0 gap at 0 and in the 0 gap at s subgames. In the 0 gap subgame at 0, we have more
risk-taking if:
q  p(1  p)2 (1)
In the 0 gap subgame at s, we have more risk-taking if:
q  p(1  p)(1  q) (2)
Clearly a larger set of parameters will satisfy (1) than (2). Dene:
q0 = p(1  p)2
qs = p(1  p)(1  q)
Formally we can state the following11:
Corollary 1 (Performance and Risk) In the 0-performance gap subgame worse-
performing funds are more prone to choosing the riskier portfolio than better-performing
funds. Formally q0 < qs.
An intriguing parallel in the case with no entry is the result that, with a large
enough performance gap, worse-performing funds (i.e. followers) tend to be riskier
than better-performing funds (i.e. leaders). This phenomenon is independent of the
absolute performance of the fund. In the case with entry, we nd that absolute
11The proof is straighforward and it is therefore omitted.
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performance matters: even when funds are of equal performance, the probability that
they choose the risky investment in the second period decreases with performance.
Let us now consider the subgame that follows an interim performance gap equal
to s in the game with entry.
Lemma 4 (Bonus stage - s gap) Under assumptions 1 and 2, the unique NE of
the bonus subgame after s-performance gap is (S;R;R):
In the s gap subgame both the follower and the entrant can only hope to outper-
form the interim leader by playing risky. The interim leader best responds by playing
safe.
In this subgame increased competition does not alter the risk-taking behaviour of
the fund managers with respect to the benchmark case with no entry. This is because,
with a large performance gap, risky is a dominant strategy for any competing fund
which is not ahead, with or without entry.
4 Interim Stage
In the interim stage we can compute expected payo¤s to each player by working
backwards (i.e. substituting each subgame with its equilibrium payo¤s) and consid-
ering the probability with which each of the subgames is reached. However, equilibria
in the bonus subgames depend on parametric conditions. Moreover the parametric
conditions needed for di¤erent equilibria to arise vary across subgames, which makes
a complete characterisation of the game in the interim stage quite tedious and - we
believe - not particularly illuminating, due to the multiplicity of equilibria.
In what follows we concentrate on two polar cases. We rst consider the region of
the parameter space where the safe portfolio is likely to be more desirable than the
risky. This is a subset of our parameter space where q is very small, and in particular
q < q0. Such a parameter region comprises safe portfolios that are certainly e¢ cient:
take, as an extreme case, q ! 0 and s ! r. We then consider the region of the
parameter space where the risky portfolio is likely to be more desirable than the safe.
This is a subset of our parameter space where q is su¢ ciently large, and in particular
q > qs. Such a parameter region comprises risky portfolios for which the expected
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value is much higher than the safe, so that all but very risk-averse investors would
prefer the risky asset class to the safe.
The presence of a potential competitor a¤ects fund managersbehaviour in the
rst period of play as well. In our set-up very high interim performances deter entry.
If either of the two incumbents displays an interim performance of (1+r); the entrant
has no chance of catching up and decides not to enter. Increased competition in the
bonus stage clearly lowers expected payo¤s for the incumbents, who may then invest
in the risky portfolio in order to deter entry.
We nd that entry deterrence induces risk-taking only in the case when risk-
taking is likely to be optimal, while both incument fund managers still play safe
when the safe portfolio is more likely to be desirable. The intuition for our results
is as follows. With the presence of a potential entrant at the end of the rst stage,
fund managers have two objectives: to compete against the other incumbent and to
deter the third fund from entry. When q is large, there is no trade-o¤ between these
two objectives, as investing in the risky asset serves both. When q is small, entry
deterrence is best achieved through playing risky, while the objective of outperforming
the current competitor is best served by investing in the safe portfolio. The cost of
entry deterrence could be measured by the extent of this trade-o¤ and in particular
by how costly it is to play risky in order to deter entry when a safer portfolio would in
fact maximise the chance of obtaining interim leadership against the other incumbent.
Such costs are weighted against the expected benets of entry deterrence, measured
by the higher continuation payo¤ in a bonus stage with fewer competitors.
We state our results for the interim stage in two separate propositions: the rst
one for q < q0; the second one for q > qs.
Lemma 5 (Interim stage - q small) Under assumptions 1 and 2, and if q < q0;
the unique equilibrium in the interim stage is (S; S), irrespective of whether a potential
entrant is present.
In the interim stage, when there is no potential entrant, the two funds stand the
same chances of winning the bonus and hence the game is symmetric. Both fund
managers will invest in the asset class that maximises the chance of outperforming
the opponent: when q is particularly low, such asset class is the safer one. The same
occurs also in the presence of an entry threat: with q low, entry deterrence is both
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very costly and likely to be ine¤ective. Hence in this parametric case the costs of
entry deterrence outweigh the benets.
We can now fully characterise the equilibrium path of the two-stage game for
q < q0.
Proposition 1 (SPE - q small) Under assumptions 1 and 2, and if q < q0 :
(i) if there is no potential entrant, the game has a unique SPE path: (S; S) in the
rst stage; in the second stage: (S; S) if the performance gap is zero, (S;R) if the
performance gap is s;
(ii) if there is a potential entrant, the game has a unique SPE path: (S; S) in the rst
stage; in the second stage: (S; S; S) if the performance gap is zero, (S;R;R) if the
performance gap is s.
By proposition 1, entry threats have no impact on the risk-taking behaviour of
the two incumbents.
When q is su¢ ciently large, playing risky may serve both the purpose of deterring
entry and of outperforming the current competitor. As a result, there is more risk-
taking in the interim stage of the game with entry compared to our benchmark case.
Proposition 2 (SPE - q large) Under assumptions 1 and 2 and if q > qs; both
incumbents play safe in the interim stage of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game with no potential entrant. In the game with entry, there are subgame perfect
equilibria where at least one of the two incumbents plays risky in the interim stage.
In this parametric case, entry threats improve on e¢ ciency. When there is no
entrant, rank-based competition may result in ine¢ ciently low levels of risk-taking.
By proposition 2, even when the expected return of the risky portfolio is much higher
than the expected return of the safe, in all subgame perfect equilibria of the two-
stage game both fund managers invests in the safe asset class. Hence fund managers
take portfolio decisions which are likely to be detrimental for the investors from an
expected value point of view. Entry threats alleviate such ine¢ ciency by inducing
higher risk-taking in order to deter entry. Investing in the risky asset class is, in this
parameter subspace, particularly e¤ective at deterring entry, because it is very likely
that the risky portfolio will obtain superior returns. There are also costs to entry
deterrence as it may be best to play safe in order to outperform a current competitor
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that is investing in the risky portfolio. However, for the parameter region that we
consider under proposition 2, the expected benets of entry deterrence are su¢ ciently
high to outweigh the costs.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main objective of our analysis is to assess whether contestability improves on
e¢ ciency in a mutual fund tournament model. There are at least two di¤erent per-
spectives one might want to look at. First of all, one might be interested in assessing
whether entry restores fund managersincentives and aligns them with the best inter-
est of the original investors. Secondly, one might want to ask whether contestability
in the fund management industry should be favoured by a benevolent regulator, who
may or may not lift, for example, entry restrictions in the market.
The fact that the objectives of fund managers who care about their rank are not
aligned with the investorsbest interests is not a surprising result: fund managers
who have rank based objectives take decisions which are detrimental for the investors
from an expected value point of view. We ask whether rank based objectives lead to
more e¢ cient outcomes when competition in the market increases and in particular
leadership in the sector can be at stake because of new competitors. Our ndings
suggest that the entry threats posed by the on-going process of creation of new funds
make portfolio decisions of fund managers more sensitive to the expected values of
investment alternatives.
Clearly this does not yet explain why evaluating fund managers according to
relative performance should be preferred to absolute performance evaluation, or al-
ternatively why investors would want to ock to past winners. In our framework
the ine¢ ciencies of relative performance evaluation are alleviated but not eliminated.
However, in a model where investment outcomes also depend on an unobservable
managerial e¤ort (see, for example, [19]), relative performance evaluation could be
used to elicit superior performances. The main implication of our analysis is the
consideration that in a market where relative performance evaluation has a role in
reducing the moral hazard problem, the potential distortion in the form of ine¢ -
cient risk-taking behaviour can be greatly alleviated by entry threats and increased
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competition.
From a policy perspective, academics and practitioners alike have often expressed
concerns about the e¤ects of relative performance evaluation of fund managers: in
particular rank-based competition has frequently been pointed at as one of the main
causes of excessive conservatism and herding behaviour among institutional investors12.
The policy implication that one could draw from our analysis is that regulators need
not be too concerned about the unwanted e¤ects of relative performance evaluation,
provided that the mutual fund industry is believed to be open to competitive pres-
sure enough so that fund managers face a realistic threat of being displaced by their
competitors.
12See for example the concerns expressed in the recent Report on Institutional Investment by P.
Myners [18].
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Appendix
Joint Probability Matrices
Consider three players investing in the safe portfolio. If one of the players is successful
(safe portfolio pays out s), the joint prob matrix for the other two players is as follows:
s 0 Marg. prob.
s p32 p2 (1  p) p2
0 p2 (1  p) p (1  p)2 p (1  p)
Marg. prob. p2 p (1  p) p
If one of the players is unsuccessful (obtains 0), the joint probability matrix for the
other two players is as follows:
s 0 Marg. prob.
s p2(1  p) p  2p2+ p32 p (1  p)
0 p (1  p)2 1  3p+ 3p2  p32 1  2p+ p2
Marg. prob. p (1  p) 1  2p+ p2 1  p
Consider three players investing in the risky portfolio. If one of the players is successful
(risky portfolio pays out r), the joint prob matrix for the other two players is as follows:
r 0 Marg. prob.
r q32 q2 (1  q) q2
0 q2 (1  q) q (1  q)2 q (1  q)
Marg. prob. q2 q (1  q) q
If one of the players is unsuccessful (obtains 0), the joint probability matrix for the
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other two players is as follows:
r 0 Marg. prob.
r q2(1  q) q   2q2+ q32 q (1  q)
0 q (1  q)2 1  3q + 3q2  q32 1  2q + q2
Marg. prob. q (1  q) 1  2q + q2 1  q
When there are only two players, the joint probability matrix is easily obtained by
the marginal probabilities.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Bonus subgame - No entry). By remark 1, we only need
to distinguish between four subgames13. Under assumption 2 payo¤ matrices are as
follows:
(1) 0 gap subgame:
S R
S p (1  p) ; p (1  p) p (1  q) ; q
R q ; p (1  q) q (1  q) ; q (1  q)
(2) (r   s) gap subgame:
S R
S 1  p+ p2 ; p (1  p) 1  q ; q(1  p)
R 1  p(1  q) ; p(1  q) 1  q + q2 ; q(1  q)
13Here and in what follows we adopt the convention of denoting the interim leader as rst player
(in the payo¤ matrices as row player), and the interim follower as second player (in the payo¤
matrices as column player). The entrant, when present, is the third player.
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(3) s gap subgame:
S R
S 1  p (1  p) ; 0 1  q (1  p) ; q (1  p)
R 1  p (1  q) ; 0 1  q + q2 ; q (1  q)
(4) r gap subgame:
S R
S 1 ; 0 1  q (1  p) ; 0
R 1 ; 0 1  q (1  q) ; 0
Under assumption 1, it is easy to verify the following: in game (1) safe is a dominant
strategy for both players, so that the unique NE is (S; S); in game (2) the unique
NE is (S; S); in game (3), playing safe is a dominant strategy for the interim leader
and playing risky is a dominant strategy for the interim follower, so that unique NE
is (S;R); nally in game (4), S is a dominant strategy for the interim leader and, as
for the interim follower, he is indi¤erent between S and R: By our assumption for the
case of indi¤erence, the follower prefers to hold a risky portfolio. Hence the unique
NE in game (4) is (S;R).
Proof of Lemma 2 (Bonus stage - zero gap at 0). Under assumption 2, payo¤
matrices are below.
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Suppose the entrant plays S, then:
S R
S
p(1  p)2
p(1  p)2
p(1  p)2
p(1  p) (1  q)
q
p(1  p) (1  q)
R
q
p(1  p) (1  q)
p(1  p) (1  q)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)
p(1  2q + q2)
When the entrant plays R, the payo¤ matrix is as follows:
S R
S
p(1  p) (1  q)
p(1  p) (1  q)
q
p(1  2q + q2)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)
R
q(1  q)
p(1  2q + q2)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)2
q(1  q)2
q(1  q)2
Under assumption 1, we can easily show that if q < p(1  p)2, then NE is (S; S; S);
if q > p(1  p)2, NE are (R;S; S) (S;R; S) and (S; S;R):
Proof of Lemma 3 (Bonus stage - zero gap at s). In the subgame that follows an
interim performance of s (here for both incumbents), for the entrant it is a dominant
strategy to play risky. When the entrant plays risky, and under assumption 2, the
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payo¤ matrix is as follows:
S R
S
p(1  p) (1  q)
p(1  p) (1  q)
q(1  2p+ p2)
p (1  q)
q
q(1  q)
R
q
p (1  q)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)
q(1  q)2
Under assumption 1, it is easy to verify that if q < p(1  p) (1  q) NE is (S; S;R);
when p(1  p) (1  q) < q NE are (S;R;R) and (R;S;R):
Proof of Lemma 4 (Bonus stage - s gap). When one of the two incuments reaches
the interim stage with performance equal to (1 + s) for the entrant it is a dominant
strategy to play risky. Under assumption 2, the payo¤ matrix is as follows:
S R
S
p+ (1  q)(1  2p+ p2)
0
q(1  2p+ p2)
p+ (1  p)(1  2q + q2)
q(1  q)(1  p)
q(1  q)(1  p)
R
q + (1  p)
p (1  q) (1  2q + q2)
q(1  q)
q + (1  3q + 3q2  q32)
q(1  q)2
q(1  q)2
For the follower it is dominant to play risky. Recall that by assumption 1  < p
q
.
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Hence we can show that
p+ (1  p)(1  2q + q2) > q + (1  3q + 3q2  q32)
so that the unique NE for this subgame is (S;R;R):
Proof of Lemma 5 (Interim stage - q small) Consider rst the interim stage
for the benchmark case with no entry. The game is symmetric, hence we only specify
payo¤s for the rst player. Expected payo¤s to player 1 from each investment pair in
the interim stage are as follows:
1(S; S) = p (1  p) (2  2p+ 2p2)
1(S;R) = (1  p) (1  p) (1  q) p+ p (1  q) [1  (1  p)q] + p2q(1  p)
1(R;S) = (1  p) (1  p) (1  q) p+ pq (1  q) (1  p)+ q (1  p) [1  q(1  p)]+
pq [1  p+ p2]
1(R;R) = [1  2q + 2q2] p (1  p) + q (1  q) [1  q (1  p)]
We show that, under assumption 1 and for  and  su¢ ciently small, S is a dominant
strategy for player 1 (player 2). In fact:
lim
!1
[1(S; S)  1(R;S)] = p(1  p)2 + q(1  q) + pq2 > 0
Moreover:
lim
!1;!1
[1(S;R)  1(R;R)] = (p q)

2pq(1  p) + p(p  q2) + (1  q)((1  p)  q) > 0
By continuity, 9b; b < 1 such that 8  b and   b, it is still the case that S is a
dominant strategy. Hence (S; S) is the unique NE for the interim stage of the game
with no entry.
Consider now the game with a potential entrant. The game is symmetric, hence we
only specify payo¤s and provide results for the rst player. When q < q0 Expected
payo¤s to player 1 from each investment pair in the interim stage are as follows:
1(S; S) = (1  2p+ p2)  p(1  p)2+ p2  p(1  p)(1  q) + p(1  p)  [p+ (1 
p)(1  2q + q2)] + p(1  p)  (1  p)q(1  q)
1(S;R) = (1 p)(1 q)p(1 p)2+p(1 q)[p+(1 p)(1 2q+q2)]+pq p(1 p)
24
1(R;S) = (1  p)(1  q)  p(1  p)2 + p(1  q)  (1  p)q(1  q) + q(1  p)  [1 
q(1  p)] + pq  [(1  p) + p2]
1(R;R) = (1  2q + q2)  p(1  p)2 + q2  p(1  p) + q(1  q)  [1  q(1  p)]
We show that, under assumption 1 and for  and  su¢ ciently small, S is a dominant
strategy for player 1 (player 2). In fact:
lim
!1;!1
[1(S; S)  1(R;S)]  0
lim
!1;!1
[1(S;R)  1(R;R)]  0
The rst inequality can be rewritten as:
[1(S; S)  1(R;S)]!1;!1 = p(1 p)[(1 q)(1+q)2 (1 p)(1 p)p] q+(1 p)(p3+q2)
Given our parametric restriction on q we have that:
[1(S; S)  1(R;S)]!1;!1 
 p(1  p)[(1  q)(1 + q)2   (1  p)[1 + p(1  p)]] + (1  p)(p3 + q2) =
= p(1  p)[(2  p)p2 + q(1  q   q2)] + (1  p)(p3 + q2) =
= p(1  p)[(2  p)p2   q3 + q(1  q)] + (1  p)(p3 + q2)
Applying our parametric restriction on q again (given that q < p(1  p)2) the expres-
sion in the square brakets is always positive. This shows that in the interim stage
S is a best response to S. We prove below that players prefer to play S also as a
response to R.
[1(S;R)  1(R;R)]!1;!1 =
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= p(1  2q)  p4(1  q)  q(1  q)2 + p2[ 1 + 2q + q3   p( 2 + 2q + q2)]
 p(1  2q)  p4(1  q)  q(1  q)2 + p2[1 + q3   q2] =
= p(1  q)  pq   p4(1  q)  q(1  q)2 + p2   p2q2(1  q) =
= (p2   pq) + (1  q)[p  p4   q(1  q)  p2q2] =
= (p2   pq) + (1  q)[p(1 + p)(1  p)2   q((1  q) + p2q)]
Given that ((1  q)+p2q) < 1 and that q < p(1 p)2 the expression in square brakets
is positive, hence for ! 1 and ! 1, S is a dominant strategy for player 1 (player
2). By continuity, 9b; b < 1 such that 8  b and   b, (S; S) is the unique NE for
the interim stage.
Proof of Proposition 1 (SPE - q small) For the benchmark case, by lemma 1
and 5; for the game with a potential entrant, by lemma 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 2 (SPE - q large) First consider the game without potential
entrant. Notice that in the proof of lemma 5 we have not used the restriction q < q0 in
order to establish that (S; S) is the unique NE for the interim stage of the game
without entry. Hence the same result holds here. When q > qs, under assumption 1
and for  and  su¢ ciently small, for q > qs an identical proof to the one used above
for lemma 5 shows that S is a dominant strategy for player 1 (player 2).
Consider now the game with the potential entrant. Recall that when q > qs there are
multiple equilibria in the bonus stage. Hence, for each action choice in the interim
stage, there will be more than one continuation payo¤ for the bonus stage We prove
our claim by construction. We show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria for
the two-stage game such that in the interim stage one player plays S and the other
player plays R. Consider the following (partial description of) candidate equilibrium
strategies: player 1 (player 2) plays safe (risky) in the interim stage; risky (safe) in the
0 gap at 0 subgame; safe (risky) in the 0 gap at s subgame. Notice that such a strategy
pair induces the highest continuation payo¤ for player 1 (max1 (S;R)) and the lowest
continuation payo¤ for player 2.(min2 (S;R)). Consider now punishment strategies
such that, if either player deviates, they obtain the lowest continuation payo¤ in the
bonus stage. Notice that such punishments are credible because the punishing player
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obtains a (higher) Nash payo¤. To prove that neither player deviates, we show that:

max1 (S;R)  min1 (R;R)

!1;!1 > 0
Moreover 9p > 0 such that 8p < p:

min2 (S;R)  min1 (R;R)

!1;!1 > 0
where
max1 (S;R) = (1  p)(1  q)q + p(1  q)(p+ (1  p)(1  2q + q2)) + pqp(1  p)
min1 (R;R) = (1 2q+q2)p(1 p)(1 q)+q2p(1 p)+q(1 q)(1 q(1 p))
min2 (S;R) = 
min
1 (R;S) = (1  p)(1  q)p(1  p)(1  q) + p(1  q)(1  p)q(1 
q) + q(1  p)(1  q(1  p)) + pq(1  p+ p2)
When q ! p(1  p), the rst inequality can be rewritten as:
p2(1  (3  p)(1  p)p(1  (1  p)p))
which is always positive for p  1:The second inequality can be rewritten as:
(1  p)p2(1  (1  p)p)(2  p(5  2p(2  p)))
which is positive as long as p is not very high.
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